LexPressed and ELSA have teamed up to publish this article on the occasion of the European Commission’s Trade Policy Day. It brings together insights from young legal minds across Europe and beyond, offering fresh perspectives on how the EU can shape a trade policy that reflects the priorities, expectations, and global realities facing the next generation.

1. From Structural Adjustment Programs to Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: Same Poison, Different Bottle

Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) are now widely regarded as policies of the past, programs so heavily criticised by economists, lawmakers, and civil society that they eventually faded away. Yet, this decline was more a matter of rebranding than a fundamental shift in how global institutions approach poverty and economic development. SAPs were replaced not by a new economic philosophy, but by a new instrument. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) were introduced to address criticisms of SAPs while continuing to guide developing economies in restructuring their economies. Although PRSPs did soften certain aspects of SAP conditionality, they preserved many of the same core features that had long proven detrimental for economic development, particularly in the Global South.

During the debt crises of the 1970s and 1980s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank created SAPs to assist over-indebted developing countries, on the condition that they restructured their economies. [1] While conditions varied, most countries were required to adopt neoliberal reforms, such as trade liberalisation through the removal of quantitative restrictions, privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and deregulation of markets. [2] By the end of the 1990s, many countries implementing SAPs experienced tagnation or even collapse in per capita income, [3] reinforcing criticism that these reforms undermined development rather than supporting it.

As SAPs came to be seen as failures, the IMF and the World Bank introduced PRSPs, presenting them as more “country-driven” and centred on poverty reduction. [4] While PRSPs addressed some sovereignty concerns and incorporated participatory elements, they continued to require adherence to core neoliberal principles, particularly trade liberalisation and privatisation. Ethiopia’s PRSP, for example, introduced tax reforms that favoured foreign private investment over the development of domestic industry. While the process improved communication between the government and marginalised communities, it also contributed to growth in the informal economy (a sector representing roughly half of Ethiopia’s GDP) without substantially improving conditions for workers within it. [5] Additionally, empirical assessments suggest that PRSPs have not produced significant improvements in poverty reduction. [6]

This continuity raises a broader concern: policies presented as poverty-reducing continue to rely on the same economic prescriptions that contributed to stagnation under SAPs. This dynamic sits uneasily with the idea of “just trade.” A just international trading system should ensure that gains from trade benefit all participants, including the least advantaged states. 7 Can developed economies truly claim to support “just trade” if the policies they promote reproduce the same harm of the past, merely repackaged under a different name? If developed economies genuinely seek to promote development and reduce poverty, they must move beyond repackaged conditionality and support reforms grounded in fairness and equity. This could include making fuller use of special and differential treatment in the WTO, expanding access to alternative development financing, and integrating non-economic objectives (such as human rights protections) into the design of global economic governance. [7]

By Benacio Rosas

[1] Christopher Ogola, ‘Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and Social, Economic and Political Stability of the Least Developed Countries Since 1980s’ (2025) 968.

[2] Ibid 969; see also De Angelis M, ‘Neoliberal Governance, Reproduction and Accumulation’ (2003) The Commoner 7, 7 where the author compiles the policies of the “Washington Consensus”.

[3] Salih O. Nur, ‘From SAPs to PRSPs: ideological dogmatism in development policy and good governance in the era of neoliberalism’ (2015) 2 indicates that per capita income in Africa dropped 20% between the period of 1980 and 1997, when these programs were implemented in most African countries.

[4] Craig, David and Doug Porter, “Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A New Convergence.” (2002) World Development 30 (12)

[5] Buckley, Graeme J., Decent Work in a Least Developed Country: A Critical Assessment of the Ethiopia PRSP (2004). International Labour Office Working Paper No. 42 15 – 19.
[6] Elkins, Meg and Feeny, Simon and Prentice, David, Do Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers Reduce Poverty and Improve Well-Being? (2015) 17.

[7] Pauwelyn, Joost, Book Review: Trade, Inequality, and Justice: Toward a Liberal Theory of Just Trade. George Washington International Law Review (2005) Vol. 3, No. 2, Duke Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 70 104.

2.1 How can international trade law be shaped to be fair, competitive, and just? The Role of the WTO.

The question of how international trade law is to be shaped to be fair, competitive, and just presupposes the presence of unfairness, injustices and distortive practices in world trade under the currently functioning legal regime. And this is admittedly true: geopolitical conflicts increasingly adopt trade dimensions, [1] revealing the long-standing and now highly visible interdependence between trade and foreign policy. [2] Climate challenges further question the utility and sustainability of existing trade rules while the gap between the development of the Global North and the South remains still open.[3]

All of these challenges call for action and reform. The economic and societal gains generated by trade liberalisation are clear. Trade has contributed to the rise in living standards across the world and remains one of the most effective tools for development. [4] However, the existing framework most of which has been drafted in the post-WWII period of stable geopolitical alignments, wide unawareness of climate issues, and when segregation was still a normality, cannot be expected to serve perfectly the contemporary needs of our constantly changing and developing society. [5] Moreover, taking a closer look, one may see the intrinsic interplay of trade and foreign policy which has always existed and which lead to an ill-balanced trade law system which simply reflects the geopolitical power imbalances. The question that arises then is, is it possible at all to shape international trade law to be fair, competitive and just given these complex intricacies of its nature and practice? Without delving deeper into international relations theories and their view on international law given the limited scope of this contribution, this piece argues that international trade law can be shaped to be fair, competitive and just and the WTO has been playing and has the capacity to continue playing an instrumental role in doing this.

“The current nameless global order, dominated by the World Trade Organization, (...) is untenable and unsustainable”[6] is a statement of the US trade representative which perfectly encapsulates the current crises of the WTO and the intrusion of politics in the trade (law) landscape. This, nonetheless, does not come to suggest that the intertwinement of trade and politics should be accepted, any existing rules should be eradicated and international trade is to be purely pursued as a set of bilateral business-like deals. Such a move can in no way be expected to deliver any fairness, competition and justice, as it will only seal the power politics tendency in the world, spilling it into the trade relations of states.[7]

The only meaningful way to counteract power disparities in international trade is through a centralised and autonomous institution capable of ensuring reciprocity and equality. The WTO has demonstrated this capacity both in view of its design and substantive rules, [8] and given its dispute settlement system which has historically been recognised as one of the most successful and effective fora for settlement of international disputes.[9] It should and can become again the symbol of successful inter-state cooperation especially nowadays when multilateralism in general is in crisis. [10] To do so, the WTO must be at the centre of reform. On the one hand, some of its rules need to be updated, but this should take place in a multilaterally coordinated way rather than through fragmented individual or regional initiatives that risk deepening inequalities. The consensus rule which led to the current block of the Appellate Body may be revised with a view of improving the effectiveness of the institution and eliminating the chance for future obstruction of the work of the WTO. On the other hand, as suggested by scholars, existing tools, including the possibility of situation complaints under Article XXIII (1) (c) GATT and collective responses under Article XXV GATT, offer ways forward. [11] The willingness of most members to preserve the organisation, illustrated by the creation of the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement, reinforces that there is political willingness for reform of the WTO through the active use of existing instruments. Eventually, shaping international trade to be fair, competitive, and competitive relies on inter-state cooperation and the overall strengthening of the multilateral trade system in which the WTO plays a central role.

By Iveta Ivanova

[1] James Chen, ‘Trade Wars: History, Pros & Cons, and U.S.–China Example’ Investopedia (31 January 2025) <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/trade-war.asp> accessed 16 November 2025.

[2] As the former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has put it “Our foreign and economic relations remain indivisible”, See Hillary Rodham Clinton, ‘Economic Statecraft’ (Remarks at the Economic Club of New York, New York City, 14 October 2011) <https://20092017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/10/175552.htm> accessed 16 November 2025.

[3] Aaron Cosbey and Petros C Mavroidis, ‘A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial Policy and Renewable Energy: The Case for Redrafting the Subsidies Agreement of the WTO’ (2014) 17 Journal of International Economic Law 11; Chiara Rambaldi, ‘A review of the development divide between Global North and South through a Foucauldian perspective’ (2022) 9 Development Studies Research 67.

[4] World Bank Group and World Trade Organization, Trade and Poverty Reduction: New Evidence of Impacts in Developing Countries (WTO 2018).

[5] Especially in view of the so-called Acceleration of history phenomenon.

[6] Jamieson Greer, ‘Trump’s Trade Representative: Why We Remade the Global Order’ The New York Times (7 August 2025) <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/07/opinion/trump-trade-tariffs.html>accessed 16 November 2025.

[7] The latest action of the USA paying their overdue contributions to the WTO despite the frequent attacks against the institution supports this. See, ‘Trump administration quietly pays overdue WTO fees’ Financial Times (29 October 2025) <https://www.ft.com/content/e87a62d5-65be-4246-b7b1-290e34770f81> accessed 16 November 2025.

[8] The preamble of the founding treaty of the institution refers namely to “entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements” while some of the foundational principles contained in the GATT guarantee this i.e MFN, National Treatment, etc. See, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (opened for signature 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) preamble; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art I, III.

[9] Jackson, John H, ‘The Role and Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism’ in Susan M Collins and Dani Rodrik (eds), Brookings Trade Forum 2000 (Brookings Institution Press 2001) 179; Shapiro, Ira, S Bruce Wilson, D G Waddell and Bernd Langeheine, ‘Comments: National Perspectives on the System’ (1998) 32 The International Lawyer 811; Davey, William J, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement System’ (2000) 3 Journal of International Economic Law 15; Petersmann, Ernst Ulrich, The GATT WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law, International Organizations and Dispute Settlement (Kluwer Law International 1997) 4; Shaffer, Gregory, Towards a Development Supportive Dispute Settlement System in the WTO (ICTSD Resource Paper 5, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 2003).

[10] Brunnée, Jutta, ‘Multilateralism in Crisis’ (2018) 112 Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting 179.

[11] Pinchis Paulsen, Mona and Ciuriak, Dan ‘The Case for WTO Collective Action’ (forthcoming 2025) World Trade Review, Working Paper Draft, 6 November 2025.

2.2 How can international trade law be shaped to be fair, competitive and just? Environmental Prioritization beyond Sustainable Development

As COP30 runs into its second week, the negotiations and meetings on climate adaptation measures offer a sound reminder of how far-reaching environmental considerations tie into the global economy. Initiatives like the “Belém 4X” demonstrated the global commitment towards sustainable energy transition. [1] However, as Brazilian President Lula rightly pointed out in his opening speech, “We are moving in the right direction, but at the wrong speed.” While the climate threats worsen with global warming, fairness and justice in international trade can only be achieved if impacts beyond trade are taken into account.

This balance of environmental considerations with economic growth is contained in concept of sustainable development – a guiding principle in international law since the Brundtland Commission’s 1987 and recently reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion. However, in the years leading up to the World Trade Organization, environmental considerations have taken a backseat to trade principles in international trade law (see for example, the rejection of environmental protection as an Article XX defense in the Tuna-Dolphin dispute) [3] . In the late 1990s, sustainable development was accepted by the WTO Appellate Panel as guiding principle to determine Article XX defenses. [4] Presently, as the world edges closer to the 1.5°C overshoot resulting in irreversible environmental damage [5] , the need for environmental considerations to form the top priority of international trade law is more important than ever.

While sustainable development is recognized to inform the WTO Agreement, [6] environmental considerations should be the foremost consideration. Despite efforts to reform the energy commodities trade to meet sustainability goals, new forms of trade (such as Artificial Intelligence and related products) threaten to undermine them due to their voracious consumption of energy and water resources in their use. [7]

Although there are other regimes that spearhead global environmental protection (like the UNFCCC), international trade law is too large a corpus of economic activity and international law to ignore this issue.

Therefore, while preserving international trade and economic growth around the world is important in an increasingly isolationist world, the ultimate objective should be ensuring an equitable planet for trade and human activity to continue. With scientific reports warning of the devastating consequences of climate change, economic gain in the short-term is not worth the environmental, social and eventual economic harm in the long term.

By Joshua Tan

[1] Mayara Souto, ‘COP30 Presidency mobilizes countries and key sectors to implement commitment to quadruple sustainable fuels’ (COP30, 14 November 2025) <https://cop30.br/en/news-about-cop30/cop30-presidency-mobilizes-countries-and-key-sectors-to-implement-commitment-to-quadruple-sustainable-fuels> accessed 16 November 2025.

[2] Nicole Angel, ‘”We are moving in the right direction, but at the wrong speed”, warns Lula at the opening of COP30’ (COP30, 10 November 2025) <https://cop30.br/en/news-about-cop30/we-are-moving-in-the-right-direction-but-at-the-wrong-speed-warns-lula-at-the-opening-of-cop30> accessed 16 November 2025.

[3] United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (1991) GATT BISD 39S/155, [5.27].

[4] WTO, United States: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products – Report of the Appellate Body (12 October 1998) WT/DS58/AB/R (Shrimp-Turtle case), [131].

[5] Summary for Policymakers’ in Core Writing Team, Hoesung Lee and José Romeo (eds), Synthesis Report: Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2023)

[6] Shrimp-Turtle case (n 4), [151].

[7] Trading with intelligence: How AI shapes and is shaped by international trade’ (WTO, 2024) < https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trading_with_intelligence_e.pdf> accessed 16 November 2025, 16.

3. From Fragmentation to Unity: l’union fait la force

It has become clear that we no longer live in an era in which unrestricted global trade was considered as an unquestionable cornerstone of a liberal, open world. Protectionist tendencies have re-emerged across the globe, particularly in some of the world’s largest economies. In this new reality, the European Union must, in my opinion, strike a delicate balance between two objectives: achieving strategic autonomy and remaining a fair and reliable trade partner.

Nick Shamp; Best Orator of the Semi-Finals of the Regional Round Geneva of the 23rd Edition of the JHJMCC

Pursuing strategic autonomy is vital for reducing dependence on geopolitically sensitive supply chains and ensuring that the European Union can continue to act in accordance with its own governing principles. Building a truly resilient internal market — one that is both integrated and innovative — will be essential to achieving a sufficient level of autonomy. Yet this concept of strategic autonomy should not be mistaken for isolationism. It rather represents the capacity to act independently and assertively whenever Europe’s economic or security interests are at risk. This is particularly relevant in critical sectors such as semiconductors, renewable energy, and digital technologies, where vulnerabilities are increasingly translating into strategic risks.

At the same time, the EU must continue to present itself as a reliable, forward-looking, and fair trade partner. Europe’s credibility in global trade depends not only on its economic strength, but also on its reputation as a principled and reliable partner. This is particularly pertinent at a time when the leaders of some of the world's most powerful nations favour realpolitik over a consistent approach. Openness and fairness, however, must go hand in hand with firmness. The Union should be equipped with effective defensive and coercive instruments that allow it to act decisively when confronted with unfair trade practices.

Crucially, none of this will be possible without an unprecedented level of unity and cooperation among the Member States. A divided Europe cannot be a credible global actor. This is precisely where law students and the next generation more broadly come into play. The challenge for young lawyers and students goes beyond understanding the European Union and its legal framework; it lies in shaping a shared European consciousness. In an increasingly polarized society, our task is to bridge national divides and internalize what it truly means to act as Europeans on the global stage. That very transformation starts with us, the next generation of European citizens, who can champion a European perspective that prioritizes cooperation over competition and solidarity over fragmentation. By doing so, we can help build an EU trade policy that reflects not only Europe’s interests but also its enduring values of freedom and fairness.

By Nick Shamp

4. Poisoning International Trade

Nikola Grochowska; Head of Marketing for the 23rd edition of the John H. Jackson Moot Court Competition

Despite the growing popularity of “fair and equitable trade” as a catchphrase in international forums, global realities increasingly diverge from these ideals. The landscape is defined by the U.S. waging a “Reciprocal Tariff War,” China assertively expanding its global influence and challenging American dominance, while Europe navigates between the two powers, pursuing competitiveness through deregulation, strategic autonomy, and state-backed innovation. In such a climate, fairness and equity in trade risk becoming rhetorical rather than real.

One troubling trend, especially in recent U.S. trade practice, is the proliferation of “poison pill” provisions, as seen in the 2025 United States-Malaysia and United States-Cambodia Agreements on Reciprocal Trade (ART). These clauses empower the U.S. to terminate agreements if its partners conclude pacts that allegedly “jeopardize essential U.S. interests” or “pose a material threat” to U.S. security, a concept first introduced in the 2018 USMCA, now expanded in scope and severity. Poison pills effectively act as loyalty tests, pressuring smaller economies to align their trade policy with U.S. geopolitical priorities.

Such provisions stand in stark opposition to foundational principles of the international trade regime, especially the World Trade Organization’s most-favored-nation (MFN) and non-discrimination obligations. By restricting countries like Malaysia or Mexico from negotiating free trade agreements with so-called “non-market economies” (widely understood to mean China), these clauses prevent the extension of equal benefits and concessions to all WTO members. They thus contravene the MFN principle, designed to guarantee equality and predictability in trade relations.

Crucially, poison pill clauses incentivize the emergence of exclusive, politically motivated trade blocs, eroding the multilateral and rules-based order upon which the WTO is built. Rather than promoting openness and mutual benefit, they serve as instruments for dominant powers to advance their foreign policy agendas at the expense of legal commitments and the autonomy of smaller states. In doing so, they undermine the very spirit of justice, equality, and rule of law that is essential for truly fair and equitable global commerce.

To address these challenges and restore the integrity of the rules-based trading system, international trade governance must prioritize transparency and multilateral oversight. The WTO and other global trade institutions should work to develop clear guidelines that prohibit discriminatory provisions like poison pills and reinforce the primacy of core WTO principles. Expanding dispute settlement procedures to include review of exclusivity clauses would empower smaller economies to challenge such unfair practices. By strengthening institutional checks and fostering genuine dialogue among diverse stakeholders, the international community can move toward a more just, competitive, and equitable system of trade law.

By Nikola Grochowska

[1] Gil Lan, “The "Poison Pill" in the USMCA: The Erosion of WTO Principles and its Implications under a US-China Trade War”, 53 Vanderbilt Law Review 1265 (2021) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol53/iss4/3

[2] Simon Evenett, “Can Trading Partners Still Hedge? U.S. Poison Pills and the Limits of Dual Engagement”, Zeitgeist Series Briefing #77, 31 Oct 2025, Available at: https://globaltradealert.org/reports/US-poison-pills ● Peter Foster, Owen Walker and A. Anantha Lakshmi “US adds ‘poison pills’ to Asia trade pacts to counter China”, The Financial Times, 6 Nov 2025, Available at:https://on.ft.com/4oyyVTD

[3] Nick Beams, “"Poison pills” extend Trump’s trade war”, World Socialist Website, 7 Nov 2025, Available at: https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2025/11/08/bdkx-n08.html

[4] Chen Bo, ““Poison Pill” Goes Global? The US-Vietnam Trade Deal and Beyond”, EAI Commentary No. 95, 13 Aug 2025, Available at: https://research.nus.edu.sg/eai/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/EAIC-95-20250813.pdf

And outside of Europe, what does the future generation have to say?

5.1. From Kenya’s perspective, what does a fair and equitable EU trade policy mean for developing countries?

For developing countries, fair trade policy begins with one key distinction: we need equity, not equality. Equality would entail applying identical standards and obligations to all trading partners, regardless of prevailing circumstances. In contrast, equity acknowledges the different contexts and capabilities between parties, and actively intervenes to level the uneven playing field, rather than simply removing formal barriers. This is embodied through measures such as capacity building and asymmetrical liberalisation of markets.

5.1.1 Asymmetrical tariff elimination and liberalisation

*Anthony Mburu; Team Member of the Winning Team of the 23rd Edition of the JHJMCC*

In trade agreements negotiated between developed and developing countries, the different levels of development necessitate uneven tariff reductions rather than applying them across the board. The EU-Kenya EPA embodies this principle: it provides for immediate liberalisation of the EU market, allowing all Kenyan goods except arms to enter without tariffs or quotas, while Kenya commits to gradually reduce tariffs on EU imports over 25 years. [1] This asymmetry is not charity, but recognition that building the industrial and regulatory capacity to compete equally with developed nations requires time and support. Such an agreement acknowledges the capacity and developmental gaps between Kenya and the EU without bringing about dependency. However, developed nations must still support developing nations in building capacity for equal competition.

5.1.2 Capacity building

Capacity building refers to the enhancement of a country’s ability to compete favourably in the market through improving its infrastructure, skills and institutional frameworks. It involves providing support and resources to developing countries for their economic growth and sustainable development, extending to areas such as sustainability and climate action, as provided for in the Paris Agreement. [2] However, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), which form the majority of entities in most economies, suffer disproportionately from trade-related fixed costs compared to large and multinational firms. [3] Fair capacity building must therefore ensure that compliance costs are not overwhelming barriers that exclude the enterprises they are meant to help.

5.1.3 CBAM: A case study in inequitable policy?

From a developing country perspective, the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) clearly shows the difficulty of ensuring equity in trade and climate policy. It imposes huge economic and financial burdens upon countries without consideration for their different circumstances and respective capabilities, and fails to mitigate the impact of these burdens in developing countries and LDCs. Kenya and other African countries face the challenge that, despite making minimal contributions to climate change both historically and currently, they are forced to bear a heavy cost imposed by the very nations which have made large contributions to the problem. [4] This is cost without causation: as of 2024, per capita emissions in sub-Saharan Africa remain below one tonne per head, compared to more than five tonnes in the EU. [5] Despite this, African countries are forced to bear the cost of the CBAM, estimated to reduce the continental GDP of Africa by 0.91%. '[6] Additionally, the use of revenues raises contentious issues, as 75% of the revenue is transferred to the EU budget each year, while 25% is retained by Member States, creating the perception that the EU is using a climate measure to fund itself at the expense of other countries. [7]

Equitable trade policy would mean the EU differentiates obligations for developing countries and LDCs, and utilises revenues for climate change mitigation and adaptation purposes, specifically to offset the burden on developing countries and support their decarbonisation programs. While differentiation between countries has been contentious in the context of special and differential treatment at the WTO, [8] the current approach fails to account for the respective capabilities of countries, and therefore falls short of the standard of equitable policy.

The recent ICJ Advisory Opinion clarified that Article 4 of the UNFCCC obliges State Parties to assist developing countries, particularly those vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, through capacity building and technical and financial support. [9] This obligation may be understood to extend to the context of BCAs. By supporting decarbonisation campaigns in, and mitigating the negative effects of the CBAM on the economies of, developing countries and LDCs, [10] the EU can both achieve carbon emission reductions and enhance its compliance with the CBDRRC Principle.

5.2 What can young legal minds from both Europe and Africa do?

For emerging young legal minds in both Europe and Africa, the professional environment offers unique opportunities to reshape trade relationships and resolve past trade issues. Today's legal professionals, working in governments, international organisations, private firms, civil society, and the policy space, operate in an interconnected environment and are often positioned to influence policy. Programs and competitions such as the John H. Jackson Moot Court Competition, the WTO Young Trade Leaders Program, and WTO and AfCFTA internship programs help identify and nurture young talent while giving them the requisite exposure to kickstart their careers in trade law.

By Anthony Mburu

[1] Available at: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/news/bilateral-application-eu-kenya-trade-agreement-1-july-2024.

[2] Article 11, Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015.

[3] International Trade Centre, ‘How Aid for Trade Helps Reduce the Burden of Trade Costs on SMEs’, in OECD and WTO, Aid for Trade At A Glance 2015: Reducing Trade Costs For Inclusive, Sustainable Growth, (OECD 2015), 194. Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/aid4trade15_chap7_e.pdf.

[4] Mitchell I and Cichocka B, Transforming EU climate leadership through CBAM reform, Centre for Global Development, September 2024, 2.

[5] Mitchell I and Cichocka B, Transforming EU climate leadership through CBAM reform, 2.

[6] African Climate Foundation and the London School of Economics Firoz Lalji Institute for Africa, ‘Implications for African countries of a carbon border adjustment mechanism in the EU’, 2023, 27.

[7] Holzer K, Reflections on the use of revenues from the EU CBAM.

[8] International Institute for Sustainable Development, Guidance on Border Carbon Adjustment: Results of the Global Stakeholder Dialogues, July 2025 available at https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2025-07/border-carbon-adjustment-guidance.pdf

[9] International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change, 23 July 2025, para. 217.

[10] ACF and LSE, ‘Implications for African countries’, 36. The countries listed are: Mozambique, Djibouti, Liberia, Mauritania, Togo, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Benin, Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal and the Central African Republic.

6. Reconciling Fairness and Development: The India–EU Trade Impasse and the Role of Young Professionals

Pragya Mittal; Team Member of the Runner-Up Team of the Final Oral Round of the 23rd Edition of the JHJMCC

India and the EU have continued to revisit the same issues in their trade talks. The priorities of the two countries differ, as the EU focuses on market efficiency and a level playing field, where economic competitiveness is a key factor. Moreover, the EU emphasises high standards of labour, environment, data, competition and sustainability. These norms of fairness, which promote predictability, are appreciated; however, when considering trade relations with India, this must be balanced with developmental fairness. This is important as India, in contrast, places more significance on its policy space for development, gradual liberalisation, industrial upgrading and equitable outcomes for domestic producers and workers. This leads to a structural tension, which is considered to be one of the reasons why the 2023 deadline for the proposed India-EU Free Trade Agreement was missed. This underscores how far the two sides are still from a consensus.

As already stated, the major reason for this friction is the high standard of the regulatory model which the EU has adopted. Empirical studies have identified certain issues with this practice. While these standards aim to ensure symmetry and prevent distortion in competition, they can operate as de facto barriers for developing countries. Indian exporters often face significant compliance burdens. The logic behind this approach adopted by the EU is that this leads to equality in conditions. However, it is argued that this approach overlooks the fact that different economies have different starting points. It is inequitable to have identical obligations without provisions for capacity building.

An example where this divergence is evident is the debate on the inclusion of enforceable environmental provisions in Free Trade Agreements. While the EU is insistent on incorporating such provisions into trade agreements, however, India is hesitant to accept them. As a developing nation, these provisions, unless supplemented with financial support, technological transfer, and sufficient transition time, would impose an undue burden and have a chilling effect on incorporating non-trade issues, such as the environment and sustainability, into trade agreements.

To achieve this balance, the involvement of young professionals from both countries is crucial. This is proposed as the young professionals will form the core of policymakers, lawyers, researchers, and others who will be at the forefront of managing and interpreting trade relations. This potential is already recognised institutionally. The WTO’s Young Professionals Programme, the EU’s Junior Professionals in Delegation scheme, and India’s Young Professionals Programme at the Directorate General of Foreign Trade all offer avenues for early-career experts to work directly on trade and sustainability issues.

Thus, through academic engagement, such as international moot competitions, we can build cross-border relationships that foster collective problem-solving and creative solution-building capacities. Initiatives to involve young professionals are ardent as they would help translate global expectations into domestic realities and support industries in adapting to more transparent standards.

By Pragya Mittal

7. Rebuilding Trust in EU–China Trade Through the WTO

Tianzi Chang; Best Orator of the Quarter Finals of the Final Oral Round of the 23rd Edition of the JHJMC

Both EU and China are WTO Members, sharing the firm commitment to maintain a multilateral trade system.To promote mutual trust and fairness in trade between EU and China, we must not lose sight of the multilateral framework of the WTO.

On the one hand, a reform of WTO is necessary. With the Appellate Body (AB) being paralyzed, more importance shall be attached to other appellate mechanisms like Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA). Recent Arbitral Award of China – IPRs Enforcement shows that MPIA is a practicable choice to resolve dispute between EU and China, however, its persuasiveness and legal status still need further exploration.

On the other hand, the mature and well-developed parts of WTO shall be carefully preserved. Despite the shutdown of AB, the significance of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) itself shouldn’t be disregarded. Moreover, a greater value to be given to the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), so that EU and China are able to enhance transparency and ensure non-discrimination in trade policies, helping to bridge differences across these two Members’ legal systems.

As a law student in China and a previous orator in JHJMCC, I’m more than proud to share my opinion about the commitment of future trade lawyers in facilitating the dialogue and legal cooperation between EU and China.

Trade lawyers are not dealing with business like IPO or M&A. Our mission is to resolve disputes and foster collaboration between governments. Familiarizing ourselves with both the legal system of EU and that of China is the most effective way to prepare for the future cooperation. Beyond traditional dispute resolution, next-generation trade lawyers should also take a proactive role—helping businesses build compliance resilience under EU and PRC law. In an era of potential “decoupling” and supply chain disruptions, lawyers must guide companies in establishing compliance systems that meet both sides’ regulatory demands. This includes aligning the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive with China’s “dual carbon” goals, for instance, to prevent new trade barriers arising from diverging ESG standards and maintain sustainable development in both Members.

By Tianzi Chang

What does a fair, competitive, and secure EU trade policy mean for the next generation?